Can you elaborate on the Ralbag’s position on Yideas Hashem? If I undersatand correctly, I believe he holds that Hashem chooses not to know what one will choose to do- thus eliminating the problem of "how can we have bechera if Hashem’s fore knowledge is the cause of all thing. Can you explain this position as an obvious difficulty arises: How can something exist if Hashem does not know about it, given that Hashem "resides beyond time" and his knowledge is the reason for all existence, how can there possibly be something "out" of Hashem’s knowledge- it can’t possibly exist?
First, as a rule, we do not need to "answer up" the Milchamos Hashem in general, and on this topic in particular. The Abarbanel, Rivash, and others said the sefer contains things that are not correct, which we do not follow. We can simply leave your question at that. However, where where we can reconcile one of his controversial positions with the Torah, it is proper to do so. After all, he was the Ralbag.
So on to the topic. About Hashem "blocking" His knowledge of the future, I think you're thinking of the Raavad in Emunah Haramah, or a certain Ohr HaChaim that some people think that's what he means but really doesn't. The Ralbag says (Milchamos Hashem 3:3) that Hashem cannot know the future by "seeing" the future, but He can infallibly calculate the effects of any and all given causes, and since everything that will ever happen is dependent on causes, He can know the future in this way. But an exception would be human choice. Since a human has free will to defy the things that have an effect on his choices (upbringing, mood, personality, influence of the stars etc), an ability given only to humans, therefore, Hashem cannot know what they will ultimately choose, since He cannot rely on the causes to determine that.
Now you have 2 good questions: (a) If Hashem is lemaalah min hazeman why would the fact that a choice is in the future be an impediment to Him knowing it? If He can know the present, He can also know the future, since the only difference between present and future is time, and Hashem is immune to time? and (b.) since the whole universe is only the Ratzon Hashem, that would include people's choices as well, so how can those choices exist as the ratzon hashem without Hashem knowing His own Ratzon??
Let's take the first question first. I would suggest the reason why the Ralbag holds that Hashem cannot look into the future is because the future does not exist, not even "in the future." . It's not that if I will perform a certain act tomorrow, that means today that act exists "in the future." No. It means that act does not exist at all. Anywhere. Only past and present exist, not the future. The past exists, or "existed" because it happened and the present exists because it is here. But events come into existence when they happen, not before. When the future becomes the present, meaning, tomorrow, when I actually do that act, then it will exist. Before that, it is non-existent. There is no "place" to see what happens "in the future" because nothing really happens "in the future". When they happen, then they happen in the present. But the "future", as a place to "look" to determine what will happen tomorrow, is a myth. Tomorrow does not exist. Only today and yesterday. Therefore, Hashem cannot simply look into the future to see what will happen, since there is nowhere for Him to look. It doesn't exist. It's like saying "if theoretically I would have had a sibling born 10 years ago, would it have been a boy or a girl?" The question is absurd, and you cant expect even Hashem to know the answer because there is no answer, since in fact no sibling was born. So too asking Hashem what will happen in the future is equally absurd, since the future too is not reality.
Unless. Unless someone can figure out based on what exists now, all the causes and circumstances that exist today, what the future will be - to predict flawlessly if the stock market will go up or down, for example, not because you look into the future but because you know the present, and the effects it will have later on. That, Hashem can do even according to the Ralbag. And that means Hashem knows everything in the future because it will all depend on prior causes, EXCEPT human bechirah, which gives a person the ability to defy all causes.
So how can Hashem know what a person will choose?
Being lemaalah min hazman according to the Ralbag means that time does not affect Hashem. So when Hashem "does" something, what He will do, did do and does all happens "at once". But He subjected humans to time, which means not that time merely limits human vision so that we can only see past and present, but rather, it means that when humans do things, they do not happen all at once, but rather when one thing happens, the next thing that will happen does not yet exist anywhere. The actions of humans actually exist one at a time, as opposed to existing all at once but being unable to be perceived.
We think of time as a spreadsheet, where each cell represents a point in time. We look at being lemaalah min hazman like being able to see all the cells at once, whereas someone subject to time can only see one cell at a time. The Ralbag will learn differently. He can hold that the cells only get filled one at a time, and the future cells are never filled until they become the present. So there is no cell to look at where you can see what will happen in the future.
As far as Hashem's will being the world, the Ralbag will hold that Hashem's will, where human choice is concerned, is contingent. Meaning, it is designed like a giant If-Then-Else statement, where He leaves the final decision to the human, who is endowed with a chelek elokah mimaal that enables him to choose freely. But it is not a contradiction to the ratzon Hashem because the ratzon Hashem said that He wants it possible for a person to choose either way.
One more important thing. Regarding this particular position of the Ralbag, it is possible to say that the Ralbag holds that Hashem really does know everything in the future, including human choices, and what he wrote in Milchemes Hashem does not contradict that -- as follows:
The Rambam answers the question of yediah and bechirah simply by saying that knowledge is indeed a contradiction to free will, but Hashem has no knowledge. Knowledge is a human trait, like eyes and teeth. Hashem doesnt need knowledge, because He is not ignorant of anything even without knowledge. He "knows" but not with "knowledge." See note 35 here.
Now the Ralbag disagrees with this, in Milchamos Hashem (3:3), and he says that Hashem in fact does have knowledge, but the ultimate knowledge, way above that of humans, but knowledge nonetheless, which would preclude free choice if it extended to knowledge of future choices.
OK. But none of the problems the Ralbag has with the idea of Hashem having "non-ignorance" as opposed to "knowledge" preclude the idea of Hashem possessing non-ignorance as well as "knowledge." They merely say that we cannot say Hashem has no "knowledge". So really, the Ralbag could hold that Hashem in fact does have the non-ignorance that the Rambam mentions, but He also has "knowledge." And since He has knowledge also, that knowledge would negate bechirah, which is why he said Hashem's knowledge does not include the future. But the Ralbag could very well hold that Hashem in fact also knows the future the way the Rambam says He does, which everyone agrees would not negate Bechiah. The Ralbag just holds that we must also attribute to Hashem "knowledge" as well as "non-ignorance."
If so, even according to the Ralbag, Hashem would be "non ignorant" of the future, including human choices, and merely "knowledgeable" of the past and present. The Rambam holds Hashem is "knowledgeable" of nothing, and He is "non-ignorant" of the past, present, and future.
(I said that we can explain this particular staement of the Ralbag this way - that Hashem doesn't "know" the future. It will be much more complicated to explain another statement of the Ralbag if this is true, regarding Hashgacha Pratis, where he appears to say that Hashem knows things by way of their place in the total scheme of things, as opposed to knowing the details as details. What I am suggesting here that the Ralbag agrees that Hashem is "non-ignorant" even where He does not have "knowledge" would seem to contradict that. IY"H I will address this in the future.)