5 replies to this topic

[Chaim613]

In connection with the famous question of bechira vs. yedia/ hashgacha some of the Rishonim seem to lean more to one side (that either bechira or hashgacha is absolute and other is limited). You mentioned in another post the opinion of the Ralbag who (at least on the surface) seems to limit Hashem's ability to know the future, but that absolute free will certainly exists.

My question regards Rav Chasdei Crescas, who in his Or Hashem seems to imply the opposite, namely, that Hashem's knowledge and hashgacha are absolute, and that free will is limited. First is this a correct conclusion? Secondly, if it is true how does he say schar and onesh work?

thank you

[Rabbi Shapiro]

In connection with the famous question of bechira vs. yedia/ hashgacha some of the Rishonim seem to lean more to one side (that either bechira or hashgacha is absolute and other is limited). You mentioned in another post the opinion of the Ralbag who (at least on the surface) seems to limit Hashem's ability to know the future, but that absolute free will certainly exists.

My question regards Rav Chasdei Crescas, who in his Or Hashem seems to imply the opposite, namely, that Hashem's knowledge and hashgacha are absolute, and that free will is limited. First is this a correct conclusion? Secondly, if it is true how does he say schar and onesh work?

thank you

No, it's not the correct conclusion. But what is the correct conclusion is complicated. Here's the story:

First, his problem is not with Hashem's foreknowledge vs. Free Will. He discusses that but in the end he says that there is nothing problematic about it, for the same reasons other Rishonim do, and he adds some explication on his own. But Hashem's knowledge would not cause any problem with Bechirah as we know it, he concludes. The problem with Bechirah is this - that everything has a cause - and therefore, this (see my post of Nov 26th) - Bechirah should not be able to exist. In fact, nothing that exists or happens in the world is un-caused (i.e. random; he calls it "אפשר") and therefore my choices, including my choices to do good or bad, must also be caused. (This is a very fundamental principle in upon which many ideas in our Seforim are based. You need to know it for this discussion. Listen to this Shiur or go through the references on מוכרח המציאות and footnote #25 in this Sefer.) And if my choices are caused then they are not made freely.

He has other peripheral issues as well but this is the main one.

Now before I get into his solutions to this issue, the classic answer would simply be, as I mentioned in my post that I referenced above, that Bechirah is a miracle, and that our choices are un-caused, which is a result of our being Tzelem Elokim - Hashem, the First Cause, bestowed upon us the ability to choose Mitzvos and Aveiros without any prior cause. Many meforshim say that. And Rav Chisdai may have actually said it too though in not so many words (yes, I said "may have" - I will explain shortly) which renders the rest of the discussion in the Ohr Hashem on this topic purely academic. The reason I say he "may have " said it is because first,there are different versions of the text, and second, one of the versions can be read in different ways. Here are the two versions of the text:
.
ספר אור ה' - מאמר ב כלל ה - פרק ג
והנה כפי התורה (נ"א, ואולם אם אי אפשר מבלתי שנאמר שטבע הרצון כן חייב, שירצה ושלא ירצה בזולת מניע מחוץ, והוא הדעת הנכון כפי התורה), כבר אפשר שתיפול החלוקה בדרך אשר לקחנו בכלל הראשון מזה המאמר. וזה, שיהיה הדבר אפשרי בבחינת עצמו וסבותיו, ומחויב בסיבת ידיעתו.

Let's take the version in the parenthesis. There are two ways to read this. This can either mean

a) "If the nature of choice is such that one can choose one way or the other without any external causes - and this happens to be the correct view according to the Torah - then it is possible that free will exists both intrinsically and circumstantially."

Or it can mean:

b.) "If the nature of choice is such that one can choose one way or the other without any external causes - if that this is the correct view according to the Torah, then it is possible that free will exists both intrinsically and circumstantially."

In other words, it's not 100% clear, according ot the parenthetical version of the text above, whether Rav Chisdai is saying that this IS in fact the view of the Torah and therefore we have no problem, or merely IF this is the view of the Torah we have no problem.

The text outside the parenthesis says that this can be the view of the Torah.

Now I happen to own a photocopy of the first printing of the Ohr Hashem (Ferrara, 1550), put together by a Dr. E. Shweid and published by Makor Publishing in Jerusalem. Attached is a scan I made of the relevant passage. It is different than either of the above texts. It reads:
.
ואולם אם אי אפשר מבלתי שנאמר הרצון חייב כן שירצה או שלא ירצה בזולת מניע מחוץ: הנה כפי התורה כבר אפשר שתחול החלוקה כדרך אשר לקחנו בכלל הא' מזה המאמר: וזה שיהיה הדבר אפשריי בבחינת עצמו וסיבותיו ומחוייב בסבת ידיעתו וכו'
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The wording is difficult, and depending on which text you are using, he may be concluding that the after all is said and done, our choices are free and not bound to prior causes. If so, the only question we need to contend with is that of Hashem's foreknowledge, which, he says, does not impact on Free-Will, since it is not Hashem's knowledge that causes a person's choice in the future but rather the choice in the future that causes Hashem's knowledge in the past. Since Hashem is not bound to time, this is not a problem. (It's like one of those science-fiction stories where someone uses a time machine to go into the future and sees Reuven kill Shimon. The fact that he knows the future choice of Reuven does not mean Reuven had no choice.)

He adds more, but the bottom line is that Hashem's foreknowledge is not a contradiction to Bechirah.
.
ספר אור ה' - מאמר ב כלל ה - פרק ג
ואם ידיעתו יתברך בדברים היא קודם היותם, ולזה יראו שמה שהוא מחויב קודם היותו, איננו אפשרי, הנה איננו אפשרי בבחינת ידיעתו, אבל הוא אפשרי בבחינת עצמו ולהיות ידיעתו יתברך בלתי נופלת בזמן, הנה ידיעתו בעתיד כידיעתנו בדברים הנמצאים, אשר לא תחיב הכרח וחיוב בעצם הדברים:
אלא שכאשר נקשה ונאמר, האם ידיעתו קנויה מהנמצאים, כמו שקדם בשני הספקות האחרונים; נשיב ונאמר, אנחנו לא נדע איך ידע, אחר שידיעתו עצמותו. והוא דרך הרב לפי דעתנו:
.
(to be continued)

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[Rabbi Shapiro]

But, that's just one paragraph. In the end, it's complicated. Here's the nutshell version of his discussion:

Number One: There is no question that, presented with the choice of doing good or bad, a person can choose either. There's no predetermination that governs people's choices as such.

But only "as such." Saying that people can choose A or B is like saying if you flip a coin it could land either heads or tails. But clearly, there are factors ("causes") that combine to determine without a doubt on which side the coin will land. The force of the "flip", the wind, the position of the coin , etc. - all of these and more combine to determine how the coin will land. Even though any given coin flip could theoretically land heads or tails, the way it ends up landing is not due to the free will of the coin or the flipper, but rather to various physical "causes." So too, a person's choices are also not predetermined, but since everything in the world is determined by causes, the fact that a person chose good or bad also was due to causes that resulted in his choosing one way or another. Like the way the coin lands, choices are not random. There are reasons behind them. A person's upbringing, mood, state of mind, and for all we know perhaps billions or trillions of other factors can impact on one's choices, but one way or another, a direction a person chooses is caused.

For the sake of convenience, we will describe this by saying that a person's choices are not intrinsically determined, but they are determined circumstantially.

Number Two: even if a person's choices are subject to causes, which means he had to choose one way over another depending on the preponderance of causes, a person could still be rewarded for his Mitzvos and punished for his Aveiros, because reward and punishment are not arbitrary responses of Hashem to a person's actions. Rather, they are the direct natural effects of Mitzvos and Aveiros. If a person falls off a roof he breaks his leg, and if a person eats Chazir he goes to Gehennom (and whatever else may happen). And just as if a person falls off the roof not by his choice he would still break his leg, so too if a person does an Aveirah not by choice he suffers the consequences regardless.

The reason Hashem created this "natural consequence" of sin, is as a deterrent. The fact that a person knows he will be punished if he sins also impacts on his choice, and therefore Hashem created "punishment" as an additional cause to deter a person from sinning. The fact that there is a command not to eat Chazir and the fact that there is a punishment for eating it, are added to the set of causes that determine whether the person will eat it.

Number Three: There is still a difference between a person who is forced at gunpoint for example, to do something wrong, versus a person who is "forced" because of prior causes. The former would not punished for his actions, whereas the latter would. The reason is that this natural consequence of a sin that we refer to as punishment only happens if that sin is done through a person's choice, even if the choice was shaped by causes. But an act that was done without a person's choice, such as when he is directly forced at gunpoint, for example, is not considered a "sin" to begin with and so the natural consequences of a sin, designed to deter sinners, would not happen.

(to be continued)

[Rabbi Shapiro]

It should be noted that the question Rav Chisdai raises about Bechirah has nothing to do with religion. His question is purely philosophical-scientific. He is asking how Bechirah can exist according to science, being that all effects must have a prior cause. That is not a theological Torah rule but a simple logical, philosophical one. That is why he is clear that if the Torah happens to hold that the nature of choice is such that it does not need a cause, then the issue is resolved. The Torah's information would tell us that our philosophical-logical rule does not apply to Bechirah. Bechirah would be, as I mentioned before, a miracle, the result of the Tzelem Elokim.

Rav Chisdai's question could therefore be posed to atheists or those who do not believe in miracles with much stronger force, because they do not have the miracle answer as an option. This is one of the reasons many non-Jewish philosophers did not believe in Bechirah (of course, if they are correct, their philosophical belief was not the result of their own choice because it had to have been robitically programmed into them to think that way!).

So according to Rav Chisdai, there are two levels of compulsion: Intrinsic and circumstantial. Intrinsic compulsion is when someone is directly forced to perform a certain act, and in such a case he is not responsible for his actions; circumstantial compulsion is where a person is free to make his own choice, but that choice was necessarily shaped by an untold number of circumstances, which the person making the choice is unaware of. To him, it seems like he is totally choosing on his own. Reward and punishment does not apply to acts done under direct, intrinsic compulsion.

He then asks, if so how can the Torah require us to have certain beliefs? Beliefs are not the result of a person's personal choice but rather the representation of what a person comprehends to be true. My belief in Hashem an the Torah, for example, is not more a personal choice than my belief that the sky is blue. I do not believe in the Torah because I want to, but because I perceive it to be truth. The calculation that led me to that belief may be more complex than the belief that the sky is blue, but a person does not believe something because he wants to believe it, but rather because he perceives the belief as truth (at least that's the way it is supposed to be. Unfortunately, people do choose beliefs because they prefer them, as opposed to perceiving them as truth, which is an intellectually dishonest practice, and is the reason for many bad Hashkafos. Listen to this shiur.)

if that is the case, though, beliefs would be classified as Intrinsic Compulsion and should not be subject to schar and onesh. The reason they would be considered Intrinsic Compulsion is because a person does not choose what he perceives to be truth. Even if two people perceive the truth differently, nether of them are seeing things the way they do because they choose to but because to them it is the truth. It is like two doctors interpreting an X-Ray two different ways. They don't choose to see a broken bone; they see it that way. All beliefs (Emunos) work that way as well. How then, can there be there reward and punishment for beliefs? (And certainly in the Torah there are required beliefs the lack of which results in punishment for the non-believer.)

His answer is, the believer is not rewarded for his belief per se but rather for his happiness and his willingness to happily accept his belief. A person's reaction to his belief is not Intrinsically compelled, since a person can theoretically be unhappy about what he knows to be the truth and rebel against it.

That's pretty much it. So Rav Chisdai definitely believes in Bechirah. The question is merely on what level does Bechirah function. Is it a choice that is free on the conscious level but is subconsciously shaped by a collection of "causes," including the chooser's fear of punishment and desire for reward, or is choice unbound to "cause" altogether.

The answer is, whichever the Torah says is so.

But again, none of this has to do with Hashem's foreknowledge of the future. That is easy to reconcile with Bechirah without necessitating any of the above discussion, even according to Rav Chisdai.

All that having been said, the Abarbanel (Vayera) rejects Rav Chisdai's opinion because at the end of the day, if a person is even only circumstantially coerced into doing something, his choice is determined by causes, which is insufficient to qualify as Bechirah. In my previous post I threw in a way to perhaps defend him against this complaint, by pointing out that Rav Chisdai indeed concede that if the requirements of the Torah are that choice is totally free even circumstantially, he would accept that. He may even be saying that that is in fact what the Torah said. I also do not know which text of the Ohr Hashem the Abarbanel had, on which he based his question..

[Benjamin]

This is one of the reasons many non-Jewish philosophers did not believe in Bechirah (of course, if they are correct their philosophical belief was not the result of their own choice because it had to have been robitically programmed into them to think that way,

That would be self-refuting. You can't have any rationality without bechirah so that knocks out all these materialist atheists. They make a cage where everything must fit into but feel that they are somehow entitled to exist outside of the cage that they made for everything else. They come up with evolutionary explanations of why people believe in religion but you never see them come up with evolutionary explanations of why they believe in evolution.

Since rationality is the starting point for any further discussion, we'd only need to convince those who believe that they have a soul with Bechira but not in a Creator or maybe they do believe in a Creator but not one that can know the future. Believe it or not but there are many new age Eastern mystics who have this view. It is a problem since we see many secular Jews run off to India and Nepal in their search for 'spirituality.' However, I find it very unlikely that a Jew harboring honest questions about his faith will, after being shown the clear necessity of a Divine soul, will run off to the closest ashram to bow down to some getchka.

[Rabbi Shapiro]

Someone I know told me he was accosted by an Apikores who was trying to convince him that there is no such thing as Bechirah. I told him if that is true, then the Apikores only believes that because he has no choice in the matter.

It's like a defendant who says the judge cannot find him guilty because he has no Bechirah and it is not his fault he committed the crime. The judge then says "Fine. So I'll find you guilty because I have no Bechirah to choose differently."